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AN EIJIPIRICAL STUDY OF 
PROPERTY TAX CAPITALIZATION 
IN THE CLEVELAND AREA 
Submi tted by Kevirc Adler 
*'- I ',1(1'11d Ii),,"- t; ,) o.clm(Y,)U;ige tree :,lssistance I ho.-,'e rec·2iv,}O from 
tbe t:erlir ·,co;.'1()rnics Depa_~~·tme(1t Sta,ff ,ny [e110 1.'1 :Jonors st-udents 
Economists have long'criticized the property tax on two 
counts -- inherent assessment inaccuracies and regressivity 
with respect to income. The first problem is somewhat 
bureaucrat i c in nature, being the . esponsibility of the 
assessors. The second, however, looks into the heart of the 
property tax because it charges that the tax is 
fundamentally flawed. This paper will present evidence that 
rejects the iegressivity notion. 
Trad i tionally, tax theory held that t he proper.ty tax was 
regressive -- that is, its burden fell more heavily on low income 
persons. A newer model, begun with the work of Harberger (1962) 
and Mieszkowski (1967),1 suggests that the tax is really not 
regressive. This model is being generally applied to empirical 
testing today, so this paper will begin by presenting the old and 
new theories before beginning empirical work made possible by the 
new theory. 
Using a framework identified by Oates (1969), this paper 
will synthesize the new tax theory with the work of Tiebout 
(1954) in an effort to estimate the rate of capitalization of the 
property tax on single-family homes in the Cleveland area. 
Some modificat·ions will be made to increase the accuracy of the 
Oates I:lodel with the goal the same -- finding e'lidence about 
property tax capitalization. The regression results show a high 
high capitalization of the property tax, and the implications of 
the findings for individual municipalities and general tax 
i ,cidence will then be reviewed , 
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THE TRADITIONAL MODEL 
For purposes of analysis, the property tax is usually 
divided into two parts: a tax on land and a tax on structures. 2 
No distinction is drawn in traditional analysis between a uni.form 
nation-wide tax levy and varying jurisdictional rates. Also, 
the impact of the tax beyond the market area in which .i twas 
imposed is not fully analyzed on the assumption that the outside 
effects ar e minimal. Both are weaknesses that the general 
equilibrium theory tries to correct for. For now, however, the 
partial equilibrium analysis will be presente d, first for 
land and then for structures. 
Essentially, the tax on land is borne by the , owners of , 
land because land is fixed in supply. If land is fixed in 
supply, the diagram below shows what happens to the 
landowner's profits when a tax is imposed. 
_ _ A 
- - -_ .. _- -
The value that the us e r places on the land is shown above as 
point p~; It 1 3 a lso the pr ice the landowner i s getting for 
f. {] P. f* 
I 
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his land. (Whether the user of the land also happens to be 
the owner of it is irrelevant, for the land still Qas a 
value of P~ to him.) When the tax (T dollars for each unit 
owned) is imposed, however, the landowner mus t pay the tax, 
and this lowers the value of his land by the total tax 
dollars he pays. The user still values the land at P~ and 
will not pay more foX' it, so the tax comes solely out o f 
the earnings of the landowner. His new profit is depicted 
by the demand line (D'l with his new after-tax net profit 
being P f for each unit owned. The landowner is paid p* for 
his land but only retains PI ' the remainder going to the 
tax collector. Since owners of land bear the full burden of 
the tax on land and since landowners are generally the 
wealthier people in our society, that part of the tax is 
progressive. Wealthy people are taxed at a higher rate than 
poorer people. 
The supply curve cannot shift in response to the tax because 
the dispersion of land ownership is too wide to allow for 
collusion by landowners. Since supply is already at the 
landowner's profit-maximizing price, he will simply absorb the 
tax. The key to this scenario is the rigidity of the supply of 
land curve, an assumption that fits the situations in American 
metropolitan areas accurately. The supply of land cannot be 
extended in these 3~eas because the land is already bought up and 
being used. Toe available supply of land CQuid possibly be used 
more intensively - - that is, to earn more profit per acre -- but 
the tax collector will simply collect a higher amount of money 
., 
because the value or the land hAS risen, too.JEven if the land 
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is more profitable because it switched to a more profitable use, 
the landowner will still not keep all of his profits. The 
elasticity of the demand curve is irrelevant under these 
circumstances, too, since the tax effectively just eliminates 
some portion of the demand, is pictured. 
The analysis of the tax on structures is similar to that for 
land, except that supply is not assumed to be fixed in the long 
run. The reason that the supply of structures is not fixed is 
that 'building or maintaining them is based on the profitability 
of doing 50; if the return to investment is great enough the 
structure will be built or (if it already exists) fixed. with 
the ?ossible exception of a rare landfill, the amount of land 
on this earth is fixed more cannot be "built" even if it is 
profitable to do 50. Structures are not as easily limited, and 
so a property tax will affect the supply of structures in that it 
will reduce the profitability of building or maintenance, hence 
reduce the supply. The end result is that the profit-maximizing 
level of Q~ for the owner/producer of structures will shift if a 
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The old price (P~ ) and quantity available (Q~) change to P, and 
Q ,. Owners bear part- of the burden of the tax on structures in 
the form of lower values and profits (P~-P~). Part of the burden 
falls on the users of the structures in the form of higher 'prices 
(PI -P'.f). On net, less is produced and at a higher cost to the 
consumer (who can be thought of as the demander of structures or 
products built in those structures) . Again, the slopes of the 
supply and demand lines determine the exact magnitudes of the 
burdens. The more vertical the demand line or the more 
horizontal the supply line, the more regressive the tax is. The 
key poiClt Is that a shift which splits the burden of the tax between 
the consumer and the producer has occurred. 
Viewing the situation in more concrete terms, consider 
landlords who rent apartments. They will seek to recover the 
cost of any new property tax by shifting some of the burden to 
tenants. They can do this several ways: raise rents to cover 
some portion of the tax; maintain the building poorly but keep 
rents constant, thereby recouping some of the tax by lowering 
other costs; or not building more apartments so that the supply 
is limited, and as aging buildings fall into disuse the decreased 
supply will eventually raise the rent. All of these scenarios 
are depicted in the previous diagram the supply curve is 
raised and therefore so are prices. If this tax then falls more 
heavily on the poorer c ons umer, then it is regressive; the 
poorer people would be shouldering a larger part o f the tax 
\,;:P"·0 ! ;.' .L 
burden that e~rafioRs/ could shift to the cost of the product. 
Bearing the land c ,)U property e ff ects in mind, the question 
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of incidence (burden) of any given property tax was often 
answered by considering how much of the consumer budget went to 
paying the property tax itself or paying for goods produced on 
land and by structures/capital the tax involved. The ratio o f 
consumption to income decreases in the short run, so the property 
tax appears regressive when studied in this manner. Residential 
housing, for example, shows a marked tendency for poorer people 
spending a higher percentage of their incomes than the wealthy 
do. Even ifburden of the tax is distributed equally on all 
homes, then the poorer people will still be spending more of 
their budgets proportionally on the property tax than wealthier 
people will. This analysis holds for all consumer goods; 
assuming that some part of the property tax is shifted from 
producers to consumers, the consumers who will be paying the most 
are those who spend the highest proportion of their incomes on 
those goods. 
Many studies in the 1950's and 1960's used this type of 
analysis to conclude that the property tax burden falls heavily 
on the poor. 
below: 4 
The results of some of these studies are reproduced 
Table 3-1. Estimates or the Property Tax as a Pcrccn(ngc of Income under {he Tr:tdition.·tJ View, by Income Clnss. Various Years. 1957-70 
locome classes in thousands of dollars; other figures in percent 
Nelzer-J957 MusgrQves-J968 Pcchmoll-Okllcr-1966 ACIR--1970 
Money Non,esi~ Re3i. Family Family Res;-
il!c~me dential dentlal Total Tolal income Total iI/come ." df!nlia/ 
classb propf?rly properly property Income classb property c!assb properly c1assb properlY-
Less than 2 4.0 3.3 7.3 Less than 4 6.7 Less than 3 6.5 Less rh.!ln 2 16.6 
. 2-3 - , o.~ 1.::; 5.0 4.0-5.7 5.7 3-5 4.8 2-3 9.7 
3-4 3.2 1.4 4.6 5.7- 7.9 4.7 5-10 3.6 3-4 7.7 
4-5 3.4 1.4 4.8 7.9- 10.4 4.3 10-15 3.2 4-5 6.4 
', 5-7 2.2 1.7 3.9 10.4- 12.5 4.0 15-20 3.2 5-6 5.5 
7-10 1.6 2.0 3.6 12.5-17.5 3.7 20-25 3.1 6-7 4.7 
10-15 1.3 2,7 4,0 17.5- 22. 6 3.3 25-30 3.1 7-10 4.2 
15 and over 1.7 1.6 3.3 22 .6-35.5 3.0 30-50 3.0 10-15 3,7 
35.5-92,0 2,9 50-100 2.8 15-25 3.3 
92.0 and over 3.3 100-500 2.4 25 and over 2.9 
500-1,000 1.7 
1,OOO,and over 0.8 
Average. all Average, all Average. aU Average, all 
classes 4.6 classes 3.9 classes 3,4 classes 4.9 
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The consensus among them is that poorer families spend more of 
their budgets (percentagewise) on housing and other consumer 
goods (which have some part Qf the property tax shifted into the 
cost) than wealthier families do. That is, the property tax is 
regressive. 
Aaron does a fine job of identifyi ng the weaknesses of the 
tradi tional analysis, which will be quickly mentioned. First, 
the studies done by Okner, Netzer, etc. used the i.ncome of a 
single year when considering the burden the property tax places 
on consumers of housing. This biases the results towards 
regressivity. Th is happens because the peak and trough years of 
family income are not averaged. The inequalities' between poor 
and wealthy are much greater in a one-year period because the 
poor have a tendency to have a very low incom'e year and the 
wealthy tend to have unusually high income years. The 
inequalities in income over five years, for example, are far less 
than those over a single year, Aaron points out. S The result is , 
that a poor family might seem to be spending an incredibly high 
portion of its income (even over 100%) on goods, and a 
correspondingly large percentage on the property tax for that one 
year \vhen in reality it was only because the year's income was 
particularly low. Looking over five years, however , it could 
become apparent that the family's income/consumption ratio is - not 
really d ifferent than wealthy fami lies ', For wealthy famili es 
one year may give an artificially l ow consumption/income ratio if 
that was a very good year. 
8 Kevin Adler 
The following set of-graphs should make the point more 
clear, as they show the changing incomes of a wealthy family and 
a poor family over five years compared to the five-year average. 
The 
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The consumption/income ratio for the poor family in the fourth 
year is vastly different than the family's ratio over the five 
year period. It gives the ratio as 1, which is higher than the 
average of .8; and for the wealthy family the opposite is true 
the ratio in the fourth year (.67) is lower than the five-year 
average of .8. The result is that the poorer family seems to be 
spending far more of its budget than the wealthy family does when 
in fact it i s only doing so in the small time frame of that 
single year. If the burden of the property tax fell on each of 
these families at an identical rate, say 10% of thei r spending, 
the tax would seem to be extremely regressive when in fact it was 
the same 10% burden on each. In a grouping of large numbers of 
people this situation will happen enough to make it seem as if 
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poorer people are spending more of their budgets on goods and 
therefore more of their budgets on the property tax than the 
wealthy people are . 
I n addition, averaged or "normal" income is viewed as a 
better predictor of the spending tendencies of a household. 
Studies using normal income have found little variation in the 
percentage of money going in to housing expenditures across 
income levels. Aaron, using the same method as previous studies but 
switching to a five-year average of income, found the property 
tax to be proportional except to some renters in the lowest 
income ranges. His results are reprinted below~ 
Table 3-3. Estimates of Relation of Home Value, Tax Rate, Property Tou ,Payments, 
and Rent to Normal Income) 1967-71 SampJe Pcricd " 
Simple regressio,,. Multiple regression" 
Elasticity item Coefficient I-value Coefficient I-value ' 
Homeowners 
Home value (Ey.l') 1.132 13.7 0.995 10.4 
Tax rate (E"y) Ojl4 1.6 0.013 0.2 
Property tax pa)'ITlents (Er.y) 1.246 10.8 1.077 10.4 
Renters 
Rent (ER.Y) 0.561 10.4 0.336 S.3 
Tax rate (E •. y) 0.009 0.1 -0.040 -0.1 
Property tax pa)ments (E:r.r:) 0.569 6.4 0.491 5.6 
Property tax payments, 
adjusted for value-rent 
eJasticityb (ET,r) (Evl1u-) 0 .85!HJ.962 O. SO(H). 567 
The point to be made is that there is doubt even in the 
t~aditional, partial equilibrium approach that the tax is 
fundamentally regressi ve. Assessment inequities, if anything, 
probably create much of the discrepancy in the burden because 
more valuable homes are often assessed at a lower percentage of 
true market value.6Thi s is not done by law but by the mistakes 
of the assessors . 
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THE NEWER APPROACH 
On to the newer view, also termed general equilibrium 
analysis. General equilibrium analysis tries to account for all 
changes in price and quantity in all markets that a given tax 
change causes. 7It does not simply consider the changes in the 
market where the tax is levied, which is essentially what the 
older view did. For the property tax specifically, the 
modification of theory also allows the economist to distinguish 
between a nation-wide tax and one imposed locally at different 
rates. This is the key to my empirical work. 8 
The essence of the new view is that all owners of capital 
bear some portion of the property tax. The analysis is composed 
of three parts: a uniform national levy on all land and capital; 
the burden from different rates in different localities; and the 
effect on the supply of land and capital of those different 
rates. This model assumes a perfectly competitive world with the 
demand of one consumer to be a fairly exact microcosm for society 
at large. 
First, if a uniform tax was levied on all capital and land 
the owners of capital and land could not shift this burden. The 
reason is quite simple -- there would be no untaxed sectors to 
shi ft to. The owners of capital and land would be faced with the 
same fixed supply situation of the traditional theory, and prices 
would not be raised because the owners were already at the 
profit-maximizing point. Part of the property tax in our nation 
f~ts this model. since some minimal property tax is imposed 
ever'ywhere. The val u e of a home to i ts owner would be reduced by 
" , 
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the imposition of an additional, nationwide property tax, for 
example, but the selling price of the home would remain the same. 
This is progressive9iecause those wealthy enough to own land and 
capital would pay the full amount of the tax. 
However, all property taxes are not levied uniformly across 
the country. either on goods or by localities. The question is 
what e ffect do the deviations about the mean have on the owners 
of capital and land. The old view would predict that the owners 
would use mechanisms to shift the burden to consumers, but the 
general equilibrium approach indicates that the owners will 
instead bear most of the burden. This will happen when owners 
shift capital in an attempt to maximize their return on 
investment after the imposition of an uneven tax has created a 
disequilibrium. This will change the profitability of capital, 
land, and other factors of production. 
Capital, which is presumed to be extremely supply elastic 
in the long run/will be shifted to alternate uses so that the 
after~tax returns to capital are again equalized across regions. 
Consider the basic general equilibrium approach of two adjoining 
localities each filled with similar and competing industries. If 
the property tax is increased in one locality the profitability 
of capital there will be lowered in comparison to the other 
region's capital. Capital will tend to be shifted out of the 
high-tax area, driving the supply of capital down in that place, 
bringing the price up. At the same time the influx of capital 
into the low-tax area will lower the price of capital there and 
the profitability of owning capital. This is shown in the series 
of graphs on the next page. 
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Until the after-tax returns equal eachother (point C on both 
graphs) this shifting will continue. The end result is a return 
to cap i tal that i s lower in each area thaD before the extra tax 
was imposed in the first region. The owners of capital are 
bearing the incidence of this tax change. 
Land is fixed in overall supply, but the new view recognizes 
the effects that shifting capital may have on the uses of land in 
competing jursidictions.IOShifting capital from the high to the 
low-tax area will reduce demand for land in the high-tax area. 
This will result in lower prices being offered for the land, the 
burden falling on landowners as it had in the older view. The 
price of land in the low-tax region will rise, however, 
because of the extra demand for its use. In fact, it is 
hypothesized that the supply of lftnd may even increase in the 
low-tax area if there is some undeveloped land for which high 
bids are made. 
The real wages of members of the labor force may also be 
affected. Real wages may decline for workers in high-tax places 
because they will have less capital to work with, hence not work 
as effeciently. Or the owners of businesses that choose to 
remain in the high-tax place may try to directly limit wages to 
make up for some p art of the tax. In either case the labor force 
(a mobile body) will begin to shift from the high to low tax 
area, driving down the supply curve and wages in the latter. If 
labor is fully mobile, real wages will equalize .between the 
localities in much the same way as capital does in the long run. 
If labor and capital are fully mobile in the long run, then 
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land, which is immobile will bear the difference in the tax 
rates. This difference is capitalization, evidence of which my 
empirical work will be trying to find. Capitalization .is 
especially possible in the different jursidictions within a 
single metropolitan area because landowners cannot stop the 
movement of labor or capital within the area. Workers will be 
willing to live in several places in the metroj,Jolitan area 
because they can still get to their jobs easily in this well-
connected area. Capital will be shifted to the place where it is 
least expensive to own because the demand for what it produces 
(or the demand for capital itself) does not change within the 
well-connected metropolitan place. The only types of capital that 
will not move, in fact, are structures like hous~s or factories. 
Factories may close down, but homes in particular are as immobile 
as land and therefore bear a great deal of capitalization, as is 
being tested by my empirical work. 
Aaron uses this new approach to estimate the incidence of 
the property tax. His work shows regressivity in some of the 
lower income groups but a strong progressive nature as incomes 
rise; his work is reprinted as Appendix A. He feels that his 
results show "a reduction· in capital income" brought .about by the 
property tax. While some of his data is i mprecise, it does show 
one way in which the general equilibrium approach can be used to 
study tax incidence nationally. The advantage of using general 
e quili brium te sting is ag reed wpon al~os t un iversally by 
econo ~ ists today because it accounts for the shifting of capital 
assets that occur between taxing jurisdictions that levy at 
dif .Eerent rates . 
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THE TIEBOUT HYPOTHES I S 
Next, it is important to consider the typical environment in 
which America's property taxes occ' .. r. Most people l i ve near a 
fairly large (50,000+ person) city, that is, within a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. 11 The SMSA is comprised of small 
communities sllrrounding the central city, which is the hub of the 
business and a good deal of the entertainment acitivity for the 
SMSA. This generalization fits the model suggested by Charles 
Tiebout (1956) quite nicely. 12 His first four restrictions, when 
considered, mark out a reasonable picture of how our society 
works today: 
1. "Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will 
move to that community where their :preference 
patterns, which are set, are best satisfied. 
2. Consumer-voters are assumed to have full 
knowledge of differences among revenue 
and expenditure patterns and to react 
to those differences. 
3. There are a large number of communities in 
which the consumer-voters may choose to live. 
4. Restr ictions ; due to employment opportunity 
are not considered ... " 
To put this into the present world a little bit more 
realistically, let us say: once people have decided 
upon the metropolitan area in which they will live, they 
will choose t~e municipality that gives them the most for their 
money. The implications of this are impor tant in the context of 
the new ideas about tax incidence. 
It has been stated that in a relatively well-connected 
metropolitan area property owners have little chance to shift 
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higher property t a xe s to the workers or consumers; the immobile 
aSset, land, will bear the brunt of the higher tax. Above-
average tax rates without accompanying increases in benefits 
merely lower the attractiveness of a particular area and 
therefore lower its value and price. The situation is the same 
for homeowners who are faced with homebuyers who shop around for 
the area with the most benefits for tax dollars. Going one step 
further, a family will determine the benefits a community 
provides for them according to its own preferences and utility 
curve. Those preferences will then be weighed against the cost 
of living in that area. The property tax is a major component of 
that cost, hence places with higher property taxes and the same 
ammentities will be less attractive to the homebuyer. Homes 
there will be worth less; that is, the property tax will be 
capitalized into the value of the home and land, the immobile 
factors in the general equilibrium equation. 
THE MODEL 
Are these different tax rates between jurisdictions actually 
reflected in home value, as has been theorized? Are property 
taxes capitalized? These are the questions being tested by this 
study. The importance of capitalization is that it helps to 
identify the incidence of the property tax: it tells what the 
elasticity of the demand for housing line is. 14when coupled with 
the theory of tax incidence , the rate of capitalization will give 
a better idea of how the property tax is actually falling. I 
have chosen to use single-family homes for my study because they 
are the largest portion of these tax-generating structures in 
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communities. It seems liRely, too, that families are more 
affected by the ammenities of an area than a business would be , 
making their capitalization a better reflection of the true 
situation.l5 
To test for capitalization I have worked with Oates' model 
and made modifications that will hopefully improve upon the 
accuracy of it. I will review Oates' model, pointing out my 
changes which were usually made with reference to the work of 
King (1973). 
To begin with, there are four basic variables that determine 
the value of a given house: accessibility to the place of work~ 
quality of the specific house; quality of the specific 
neighborhood~ and the costs incurred in living th~re. King 
refers to the variables as land, structural, and locational, 
and taxes, respectively. 
Oates suggests that the basic land characteristic is the 
distance the home is from the center of the central city of the 
SMSA since that is where a high percentage of the population goes 
for work and entertainment. He uses "linear distnace of the 
municipality to midtown" as his measure of accessibility. The 
alternative is average minutes needed to travel to the . center of 
the city, which intuitively seems to measure the trouble involved 
in getting there slightly better. Unfortunately, the second is 
far more difficult to measure (depending on the time of day when 
one is travelling, ~."hich route is used , e t c .. ) so I will use the 
actual linear distance along major thoroughfares. Also, I am 
going to use a measure of how many people from each municipality 
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actually do work in Cleveland. This is a variable used by King, 
and it helps to weight the relative importance of the central 
city for each town. This will help to overcome the problem that 
many people do not use Cleveland as much as the Tiebout 
Hypothesis suggests they do; I do not want to overestimate 
Cleveland's importance to the surrounding towns or underestimate 
the pull of the Lorain-Akron SMSA in this way. 
On structural issues Oates uses the number of r ooms in a 
house as a proxy for the size, percentage of home s in an area 
over 20 years of age as a proxy for age, and family income as a 
proxy for other structural traits. The fi~st two are pretty 
st~aightfo~ward: larger homes are worth more, and older homes are 
often in worse condition (and have fewer years left to stand) and 
so are worth less. The third is based on the belief that 
wealthier families buy nicer homes on average, all else being 
equal. King suggests delving more deeply into the specific 
characteristics of homes by using assessors' data on specific 
houses, but since I am using an aggregated model the specifics do 
not seem relevant. 16 In fact, this data can only be obtained after 
the home is sold, so in many cases the sample is too small to 
really be representative. The one change I will make is that 
in one of my re gressions I ~vill us e an a verage of fainily income 
over a five-year period instead of the income of just the 
previous year. This was s uggested by Aaron (explained in detail 
above) as a more accur ate p redictor of family's hom e-buying 
habits. The inclusion of this variabl e enabled Aaron to show far 
les s regressiveness of the property tax than earlier models had; 
so it will be interest ing to see wha t its effect on 
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capitalization percentages will be.17 
The third set of variables is the most difficult to 
quantify, those of locational value. These are the benefits of 
living in a certain neighborhood or municipality, and often the 
measures used are of questionable accuracy. As Oates points out, 
"frequently the only fea s ible proxy for public output i s some 
measure of inputs." He used the expenditure per pupil in public 
schools as a measure of quality of services. This was used 
because previous research had determined that the quality of 
schooling is often the most important public ammentity to a 
family moving into an area. Schools are generally the most 
direct and largest beneficiary of property tax collections, 
making them a fairly direct measure of perceived benefit from 
money outlays. King used data on a child's performance on 
standardized tests as a measure of the quality of education, but 
he did not really find that to be any more "effective" than 
general school spending, which he also tried. 18For that reason, 
and the reason that perceived quality is possibly as important 
as actual quality (and perceived quality comes from public 
spending not test scores) I will follow Oates' model. 
The final variable in determining the value of a given home 
is the cost of living in the given communi t y. This is the 
property tax, specifically the "effective" tax rate rather than 
the legal tax rate~ This takes into account the problem that 
assessment rarely if ever measures the full value of a house. For 
the effective rate I will use the property tax collected per 
house divided by the actual (selling) price of the home. 19 In 
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addition, I used the inside 10 mill rate -- the legal rate --
just for comparison with the " true" rates. 20 
Finally, Oates included some miscellaneous variables that I 
find attractive. He used the percentage of families living below 
the poverty line because these families are more likely to rent 
homes rather than buy. Not consider ing thel!'. would then tend to 
underestimate the median family income of homeowners. 
Fortunately, I was able to find data on the median income of 
families in owner-occupied homes, which will eliminate that 
problem~ Oates also had a measure of growth in the municipality, 
which indicates an increase in demand for homes and rising home 
values. I will use the percentage change in population over the 
last decade as my measure of that variable. 
My var iables are listed below, and to the left of them is 
the sign that each is expected to take, according to the 
explanations previously advanced and past research: 
Dependent Variable: 
H= Median sale value of homes in a given 
municipatity 
Independent Variables: 
(-) Min= Travel miles to Cleveland business district 
from center of city along major roads. 
(-) Wght= Percentage of people of city who work in 
Cleveland. 
(+) Rooms= Hedian number of rooms per owner-occupied 
housing. 
(-) Age= Percentage of homes under 20 years of age 
(+) Inc= Nedian family income for 1980. 
(+) IncM= Mean family income for 1980 . 
(+) IncS= Median family for 1976-1980: 
(Inc1980+0.8(Inc1979) + •.. +O.2 ( I nc1976 » . 
3 
(-) RTax= Taxes paid per owner-occupied home. 
(-) NTax= Legal mill rate inside 10 mil. 
(+) School= Average expenditures per pupil in public 
schools. 
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(+) Grow= Population change in area from 1970-1980 . 
To confirm the intuitive reasoning for the signs I expected I 
ran single regressions on the dependent variable. for each of the 
independent variables. All were related as the theory would 
suggest. The results are in Appendix S. 
The municipalities I have chosen to study are cities and 
townships from the four counties that make up the Cleveland SMSA; 
Lake, Geagua, Cuyahoga, and Medina. The counties were chosen 
because they have traditionally been considered part of the 
Cleveland area in census reports, and they rely fairly heavily on 
Cleveland for job opportunities. I have 57 cities and townships 
in my study, ranging in size from l,OOO,OOO-person Cleveland to 
lOOO-person Spencer. Only a few of the municipalities studied 
are farther than 25 miles from Cleveland or rely on it for less 
than 10% of the jobs. 210ne final note -- I did not use villages 
(the third type of municipality in Ohio) in my study because some 
of the data was not available on them, and the data that was 
available was only marginally accurate because it was by census 
tract rather than exact village boundaries. 
THE REGRESSIONS 
I began with the basic regression of my dependent variable 
(median value of owner-occupied housing) on eight independent 
variables in a multiple regression: Min, Wght, Rooms, Age, Inc, 
































F-Test (8,48) = 93.929 
Upon reviewing the results from my first regression, it is 
evident that only a few of the variables are significant. Only 
three, family median income, % working in Cleveland, and the 
money per pupil in public schools show explanatory power with 95% 
confidence. Still, the R2 value is very high, and so the model 
is explaining a large portion of the value of a home -- what 
needs to be done is to improve upon the number of explanatory 
variables. 
First, it seems reasonable to use the natural logs for the 
independent variables. Natural logs are useful when the 
increase in the value of . an individual data point in one of the 
explanatory variables has a diminishing marginal utility_ For 
e xample. this model contains a variable measuring the distance 
the center of the municipality is from Cleveland; the farther 
away the municipality is from Cleveland, however, the less 
diff e rence it would See!fl to make to a homeowner if anot her mil~ 
was added. In other words, living four miles further from 
Cleveland makes a big difference if one was only four miles away 
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to begin with, but if one was forty miles away then four more 
miles would not really have an effect. I chose to take the 
natural log of all of my independent variables and regress them 
on the same median house variable as in the first regression. 
The table below shows the results: 
TABLE 2 


























F-Test (8,48)~ 76.4977 
In this regression the median family income and percentage 
working in Cleveland are again significant and of the correct 
signs. Improvement comes as the age of the homes in the town 
improves its significance to nearly the 95% level. Unfortunately 
the school expenditures loses its explanatory power, though once 
the o r iginal data file replaced for SCHOOL replaced the natural 
log form it did regain its T-value. Evidentally, extra money spent 
on schools is rarely vi e wed as diminishing in its marginal returns by 
home bu y er s . 
However , the variable I was testing, the tax rate, still did 
not produce a significant value. I had used as a measure of 
taxes the money each ho me owning fam ily had paid (RTa x) 1 whi ch was 
literally how much each household paid in property taxes each 
year. This biased the results, though, because a family with a 
more expe nsi ve house might be paying more in taxes but not more 
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in proportion to the value of its house1 and I needed to test the 
data in this proportion. For this new tax measure I simply 
divided the previous tax expense by the median house value. "I 






























F-Test (8,48) = 99.5881 
For the first time in the series of regressions, the tax 
rate is significant. Its sign is also correct, meaning that 
higher taxes will lower the value of a house, all else being 
equal. The three variables that were significant in the first 
regression are significant again, hence the explanatory power of 
the equation (94.3 %) is its highest yet. This equation did not 
perform better when coupled with the natural log of the median 
home values, and in fact , the T-st3tistic on the new tax rate 
fell to roughly 1.5. 23 
Table 3 represents the best T-statistics that could be 
obtained from the basic model with all the theoretical values 
~9presente~, either as the actual data points or as the natural 
logs of those points. However, the extremely high T-statistic 
values for the median family income variable indicated that 
perhaps the regression was not as accurate as it could be. The 
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very high correlation coefficient (.953) between the dependent 
variable and the family income variable also indicated a problem; 
the variable was simply overwhelming the other variables. To 
test for this multicollinearity I dropped the median family 
income variable from the regression in Table 2, with the NewRTAX 



























F-Test (8,48) : 19.7569 
The growth in explanatory value of many of these variables 
indicates the way in which the
2 
median income variable dominated 
the earlier regressions. The R is still fairly high, as is the 
F-test, mostly because the- number of rooms per home variable 
became quite powerful. In fact, this was the only regression in 
which the Rooms variable had a 95% confidence level because it 
was the only regression in which the median inco~e did not 
overshadow it. New estimates of the median income variable 
should be made to reduce the multicollinearity it has caused so 
that it can be placed in the regression once more. In addition, 
when regressions were run without the median income and the number 
of rooms represented, the population change variable (GROW) was 
significant for the first time, and the other variables had far 
\ 
---
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more explanatory power; perhaps, then, both the median income and 
average number of rooms var.iables should be modified to account 
for multicollinearity, as they are highly-correlated (. 8270). I 
have not yet included new estimates of ROOMS or INC, but clearly 
this should be done. 
CAPI'::'ALTZATION 
Before presenting the rate of capitalization of this model, 
it is important to realize that full capitalization can cause a 
great change in the value of property. If a house has a life of 
40 years and an annual rent of $2,000 it will be worth $5,000 
less if a 2% property tax differential between it and another 
identical home is fully capitalized. This is presented by the 
'. 
,. For property of a finite life. in this case forty years, we have: 
"'0 Y" 40 (Y- tV) 
V = 2: (I + r)' = 2: (1 + r)' • 
' - 1 _,.- 1 .. 1 . 
(NI) 
'here V = market value of the property;' Y = gross annual rental income, y" = net 
t:-1I!r tax) rental income, r = rate of discount. Solving for V, we get: 
V = ['2 1 1 
I + t ,~, (I + r)' 
[ " 1 ] Y>--. 1";"'1 (1 -r r) (N2) 
.:):C!:~ a rate of :liscount of 5 percent, the (lifference cited in the te~t is calculated from 
~ ! ~:xpres.sion: 
V = 52,000m 52,OOOm = S?S 550 _ 520350 = $5200 
(1 + .02m) (1 + .04m) -. • " 
~he results of Tables (3) 3nd (4) show the degree to which 
the property tax is capitalized in the Cleveland ar.ea. The 
=c.!l.lati ')'1 that. is c):e8te(1 by Table (3) is as fo.1.10ws: 
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House Value = -32953 - 211.45 ROOMS + 3.5 INC -202.46 WGHT + 
( .10) (13.3) (2.04) 
+ 112.15 MIN + 74.55 AGE +4.26 SCHOOL -
(.62) (1.42) (2.90) 
- 7125.61 NewRTax + 2.50 GROW 
(2.09) ( .07) 
This means that an increase in the tax rate on a home of 1% will 
reduce the value of that home by roughly $7,100. With the 
average home value in the study roughly $66,000, this decrease 
amounts to almost 11% of the value of a home. Full 
capitalization of a one-percent tax differential on a 
$65000 is $7477, as shown by the equations below: 
My model, equation (1) then indicates a nearly complete 
capitalization of the property tax in the Cleveland SMSA. 
The results of equation (1) seemed too good to be true, so I 
tested the capitalization rate again using the data of Table(4). 
The equation coming from Table(4) is shown below, and all but 
NewRTax have been changed out of the natural log form in which 
they appear in in Table(4) -- NewRtax has been left the same 
because it never was in natural log form. Equation 2: 
, , 
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House Value = .997 + .489 ROOMS 
(6.72) 
.601 WGHT - 1.546 MIN 
(1.04) (2.09) 
+ 2.44 AGE +.759 SCHOOL 
(1.86) (3.26) 
+4.27 GROW - .504 NewRTAX 
(.75) (3.05) 
Looking, then, at NewRTAX it can be seen that it represents a far 
more reasonable estimate of capitalization. The median home of 
$65,582 becomes 11.05 when made into a natural log for this 
equation, and so the coefficient of NewRTAX (-.504) accounts for 
a change of about 5% per unit instead of the 11% of equation(l). 
Full capitalization of the natural log of the median house value, 
done in a manner similar to the expected full capitalization of 
the first equation would result in a coefficient of 1.25 for 
NewRTAX, hence the .504 figure is able to explain a little over 
40% of the Cleveland capitalization. This is closer to the Oates 
model which explained roughly 66% of the capitalization and had 
an R'?r. of .93. The R for this equation is only. 7671 in my model, 
b ut this loss of explanatory power is due to the elimination of 
the median income variable. With corrections for 
multicollinearity it seems probable that the capitalization 
percentage will rise, just as the R2 will. The correct 
capitalization percentage undoubtedly lies between the 90+% of 
equation(l) and the 40% of equation (2) . 
Of cou ~se, if the additional tax dollars that a municipality 
gained from a tax increase were used to increase spending on a 
good that the citizens of the municipality valued; a tax increase 
could actually raise the values of homes. If school 
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expenditures, for example, were increased with the extra tax 
dollars from a property tax increase, then the model would 
predict that the average home would increase in value since the 
SCHOOL coefficient is larger than the NewRTAX coefficient and is 
positive. This is consistent with the Tiebout Hypothesis , which 
suggests that characteristics a community values will increase 
the value of homes in that community. Specifically, going back 
to equation(2) the coefficient of SCHOOL is +.739, which 
indica~es that a one-percent rise in public school expenditures 
will increase property values by .235. Making evidence of 
capitalization even more vivid, it must be remembered that 
expenditures on public schools account for only qbout 50% of the 
budget of the communities in my samples, hence a 1% rise in tax 
revenues can provide more services than simpl~ a corresponding 1% 
rise in public school allocations. Additional public goods can 
be provided, too. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Using aggregated data and a cross-sectional model I sought 
to discover the rate of capitalization of the property tax in the 
Cleveland SMSA. I encountered problems in obtaining significant 
values for several of the explanatory variables in my model, 
though the problem was lessened by the fact that the If was 
e x trem e ly high, indicating that the fewer significant variables 
had most of the explanatory power anyway. 
Capitalization of the property tax occurs in the Cleveland 
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area, but the rate of capitalization is still in question 
somewhat. Certainly it is at least 40%, as equation(2) 
indicates, but it is probably higher -- closer to the 90% 
estimation that equation (I) produces. There are two reasons for 
the continued uncertainty about the capitalization rate. First, 
corrections must be made for the multicollinearity present in the 
variables (most notably in median income and number of rooms per 
home) to gain a truer picture of the rate of capitalization. 
Preliminary indications of the strong multicollinearity effect 
can be seen in Table(4), where eliminating a variable that often 
accounted for an R2 value of over.4 reduced the R of the 
whole model by only .15. 24 Second, the cross-sectional analysis 
does not identify how far along in the process of capitalization 
the Cleveland SMSA is; capitalization does not happen instantly, 
so the full change of house values caused by a tax rate change 
may not be realized until one sells his house many years later. 
Finally, capitalization indicates that the owners of 
property are bearing a high proportion of the tax on their 
property. This implies, according to the general equilibrium 
tax analysis, that the property tax is not regressive because 
those with property are having the value of that property reduced 
by the property tax. Owners of land and capital structures (such 
as homes, in this study) are bearing the burden o f the property 
tax; unlike the partial equilibrium studies of the 1950's found, 
this study indicates that owners of pro~erty and capital cannot 
pass the burden of the tax on to the buyers of their property. If 
property owners c annot pass on the cost of the property tax to 
property buyers, then t he tax is not regressive because wealthi e r 
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people own more property and capital relative to their incomes 
than poorer people do. 
APPENDIX- 4-
Incidence ojt/ze Property Ta).: 
Table 3-5. Altern:1the E~tim3teg of Effecthe Pc()perty Tax Hates, by Adjnsted 
F:!mily Income Class, 1966 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Mieszkowski modified Harberger's theory on incidence of the 
corporate income tax to fit the property tax. 
2. My explanation of traditional tax theory is based on the 
explanation in Henry Aaron's book, ~ho Pays the Esoperty Tax?, 
which is listed in the bibliography, as are all other subsequent 
references. 
3. The concept of extensive versus intensive margins of land 
cultivation is explained in Stonier and Hague, Chapter 13. 
4. Reprinted from Aaron, page 26. His sources were books 
written by the authors of the various studies. 
5. Five years is just what Aaron decides to use -- there is 
g=~at deb~te about what the best accounting period is. In 
general, however, an unduly short accounting period makes the tax 
look regressive towards people with fluctuating incomes, namely 
the poor. 
6. Several studies have been done that indicate this is a 
problem. One is by 
7. This explanation is based on Aaron, Boadway's Public Sector 
Economics, and the two Mieszkowski articles. 
8. The models before Oates generally looked "at taxes as a 
national occurrence or by comparing large areas, usually SMSA's. 
Both systems missed the point Tiebout raised about people living 
within an SMSA, which is the focus of this study. 
9. Or at least proportional. 
10 . Th~ intensity-of-use idea again. 
11. Roughly 7~% of America lives within an SMSA, according to 
the 1980 Census Reports. 
12. His full model and some of the implications he tried to draw 
can 'be found in, "A Pure Theory 'of Local Expenditures," National 
Tax Jou.rna 1 , 1956. Tiebout suggested that in addition to his 
model showing how suburban populations grouped themselves 
together into homogeneous communities, it implied that this was 
the most efficient wa'l for the SMS.lI. to work. This has since been 
refuted theoretically,' but the model still stands as providing 
the basis for many types of empirical tests. 
14. 100% capitalization implies that the demand for housing is 
elastic. People are responding to r ising costs by reducing 
demand. The other extreme, no capitalization, implies a far more 
vertical demand line, and hence a less progressive property tax. 
1 
· FOOTNOTES (cont.) 
15. More importantly, all the ammeniti es in a neighborhood are 
not relevant to a business in the way they are to homeowners . It 
is extremely difficult to quantify what area characteristics are 
valuable to a business. 
16. The Urban Center has been collecting this data for each home 
sold since 1982, but it is only for Cleveland, not the 
surrounding communities. 
17. Its effect turned out to be negligable, so I have not 
mentioned it in the discussion of my results. It probably 
came out as irrelevant because the income of 1980 was so highly 
corelated with home value in the first place. 
18. King writes, "What is desired is a measure of the ability of 
the school to impart knowledge and skills to pupils. Yet 
acheivement scores reveal only what the pupils can do and are 
silent on the school's role." (pg. 57). In addition to trying 
the above "objective" measure, he tried teacher-student ratios, 
which are essentially the same as expenditure per pupil. 
F~nallYl he tried a questionaire with the opinions of the 
homebuyers about the school system and found this "highly 
correlated" (+.67) with the above measures. 
19. That is the best approximation of the sales-assessment ratio 
that I could obtain. Those ratios have not been kept on the 
towns in this area until the Urban Center-began with Cleveland 
and its nearby suburbs in 1982. I also tried the taxes each 
home paid, disregarding the value of the home (as will be 
explained later), and found this to be less satisfactory. 
20. Never was significant, which indicates that people are very 
careful to learn exactly what they will be paying for their 
home's property tax rate rather than worrying about what the 
legal rate is. This adds to the contention of capitalization 
theory that people are very aware of what the property tax is 
costing them versus what it is "buying" them. 
21. Perhaps a regression series should be run without the 8 
municipalities that use Cleveland for less than 10% of their 
jobs, and incidentally, are all farther than 25 miles away_ 
22. ·rhe variables are all listed on page 20. Remember that RTax 
will be switched to NewR'rAX later on in the regressions . 
23. Using LN(House Value) makes intuitive sense. The difference 
bet'ween a $10 7 000 and $20 j OOO house 'is far greater than the 
difference between a $100,000 and $110,000 house. Some variables 
improved their T-statistics with the LN(House Value) variable. 
24. Movi ng !rom Table (2) to Table (4), for example, reduced the 
total R by .1602 even though the excluded var iable had accounted 
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